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SO HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS MESS?
OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF
CITIZENS UNITED
Alexander Polikoff*
How did the American body politic allow business corporations to
threaten members of Congress by saying, credibly, ―Do what we want or
we‘ll bury you!‖?
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court‘s 5-4 decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission interpreted the U.S. Constitution‘s
First Amendment to permit corporations to spend unlimited amounts of
money to support or oppose their chosen candidates.1 ―[A] lobbyist,‖ said
the front page of the next day‘s New York Times, ―can now tell any elected
official that [if you vote wrong,] my company, labor union or interest group
will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election.‖2
The headline read, ―Lobbies‘ New Power: Cross Us, And Our Cash Will
Bury You.‖3
―Bury‖ was metaphoric but not hyperbolic. In 2008, profits of the top
100 Fortune 500 companies amounted to $600 billion.4 Were a mere one
percent of those profits allocated to electioneering, the resulting $6 billion
fund would double what the Obama or McCain campaigns spent, or what
every candidate for a House or Senate seat spent, during the 2008 election
cycle.5 In the recent rancorous health care debate, over 3,300 persons—
more than six for every member of Congress—were registered just as health
care lobbyists.6
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1
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (link).
2
David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbies’ New Power: Cross Us, And Our Cash Will Bury You, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
3
Id.
4
See Matthew Rothschild, Corporations Aren’t Persons, PROGRESSIVE (Apr. 2010),
http://www.progressive.org/mrapril10.html (citing Maryland State Senator and American University
Law Professor Jamie Raskin) (link).
5
See id.
6
Michael Tomasky, The Money Fighting Health Care Reform, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/apr/08/the-money-fighting-health-care-reform/ (link).
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To channel my distress in a useful way, I decided to try to understand
how it could have happened. Not politically, but ―doctrinally.‖ How could
such a result have been reached under the law? The answer, as it turned
out, was that it couldn‘t be. More on that later.
I. THREE STAGES
The journey to Citizens United had several stages. One was the development of the First Amendment to include under its protective umbrella attempts to influence elections either by donations to candidates or by
spending money to influence voters about candidates—for example, by
making a television movie opposing Hillary Clinton‘s run for the Presidency, which is what Citizens United was about. Spending money to influence
elections is considered speech because it is a way to express or influence
opinions; I will call it ―election speech.‖
This stage of the journey is pretty easy to trace. Although adopted in
1791, the First Amendment‘s speech clause—―Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech‖7—did not achieve its initial explicit victory in the Supreme Court until 1931 (over a California law making it
illegal to display a red flag symbolizing opposition to organized government).8 Forty years and many decisions later, University of Chicago law
professor Harry Kalven, Jr., then the country‘s preeminent First Amendment scholar, observed that speech problems were ―difficult to conceptualize and to relate to each other.‖9 He suggested that it might be a mistake to
search for a unitary theory of freedom of speech under the Constitution, that
perhaps one should seek ―not so much an organizing principle‖ as an ―organizing map‖ on which to place the problems.10
Several hundred First Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court
have followed that initial red flag case but—as Harry Kalven had predicted—no unitary theory applying to all of them has emerged. Even without an overarching theory, however, once the First Amendment began to
appear on the judicial landscape, its ―coverage‖ of election speech was never in serious doubt.11 John Doe had a First Amendment right to contribute
to Jane Doe‘s (or Hillary Clinton‘s) campaign and to spend money to support or oppose her.
Another stage of the journey was to decide whether everyone‘s protected speech was covered, or whether there were exceptions. That is, were
7

U.S. CONST. amend. I (link).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 360–61, 368–69 (1931) (link).
9
Jamie Kalven, Introduction to HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA, xi, xvii–xviii (1988) (quoting a statement Harry Kalven made to his students).
10
Id. at xviii.
11
The culminating analysis came in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (link), in
which the Court said that ―virtually every means of communicating ideas in today‘s mass society requires the expenditure of money.‖
8
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some speakers unable to fit under the First Amendment umbrella, not because of what they were saying but because of who they were? The answer
was yes, there were exceptions—several, in fact. Prisoners were one. So
were members of the Armed Forces. So were students. In each of these
cases, in spite of the First Amendment‘s absolute language, the Supreme
Court ruled that in certain contexts the government could impose restrictions on the speech rights of prisoners,12 soldiers,13 and students.14
When prisoners tried to organize a ―union,‖ the Court held that a prisoner does not have First Amendment rights ―inconsistent with . . . the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.‖15 Ruling that an
Army Captain did not have a First Amendment right to advise black soldiers not to go to Vietnam, the Court said that ―the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application‖ of the First Amendment.16 Similar rulings applied to students who,
because of the legitimate interests of their educational institutions, were
held not to have the same First Amendment rights as non-students.17
The Court also upheld laws barring federal employees not only from
contributing to members of Congress but also from taking part in political
campaigns.18 Among the reasons were that the government and its employees should ―avoid practicing political justice,‖ and that they should
―appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government [was] not to be eroded.‖19
After two stages of the journey, then, the First Amendment clearly protected election speech, but speech by certain groups of speakers could in
certain contexts be restricted because of who they were. In most of the cases referred to so far, the speaker was a human being; the third stage in the
journey to Citizens United involved corporations as speakers. Corporations
are artificial beings, created by law. Does that make a difference in whether
they fit under the First Amendment umbrella?
For a long time before the Citizens United decision, the answer was
yes; it did make a difference. In the country‘s infancy, the few corporations
that existed did so by grant of special charters from state legislatures able to

12

See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners‘ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 (1977) (link).
See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974) (link).
14
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1986) (link).
15
N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 129 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974)).
16
Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
17
See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (holding that the ―constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings‖).
18
See United States Civil Serv. Comm‘n v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)
(link).
19
Id. at 565.
13
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tie whatever strings they wished to the charters they issued.20 Soon, general
―incorporation‖ statutes replaced charters, but these too could (and still do)
contain all manner of regulatory strings.21 In the early years of our country,
the Bill of Rights was not thought to apply to corporations.22 And the evils
of permitting corporations to engage in electioneering were thought to be
self-evident.
In 1907, when at the request of President Theodore Roosevelt23 Congress banned corporate contributions to candidates,24 a Senate Report on the
proposed new law observed,
The evils of the use of money in connection with political
elections are so generally recognized that the committee
deem it unnecessary to make any argument in favor of the
general purpose of this measure. It is in the interest of
good government and calculated to promote purity in the
selection of public officials.25
In the years following 1907, the initial ban on corporate contributions,
which came to be called the Corrupt Practices Act,26 was tinkered with in a
number of ways, both by Congress and, as corporations gradually gained
First Amendment protection,27 by the Supreme Court. The tinkering produced a complicated piece of machinery, but it always included limitations
on corporate political spending.

20

Justice Stevens reviews this early history in his dissenting opinion in Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948–52 (2010).
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
See id. at 953 (quoting President Roosevelt‘s speech to Congress).
24
Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907).
25
S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906).
26
See United States v. Int‘l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 576 (1957) (link).
27
The process began in 1886 in a railroad tax case, Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
394 (1886) (link). Though the matter was not even discussed in the Court‘s opinion, the case was later
viewed as having ruled that the railroad corporation was a ―person‖ under a clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development
of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1985). That came about because a Court functionary
included a ―headnote‖ to that effect in an official summary of the Court‘s opinion that became embedded in later Supreme Court decisions. For a detailed discussion of the strange circumstances, see THOM
HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME ―PEOPLE‖—AND HOW YOU CAN
FIGHT BACK 23–32 (2d ed. 2010). Eventually the Court included First Amendment rights among those
extended to corporations, although that didn‘t happen until well into the twentieth century. See Grosjean
v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–51 (1936) (link).
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In the 1940s, because of the growing influence of organized labor,
Congress extended the ban on corporate contributions to include unions.28
In addition, because the contributions ban had been construed so narrowly
(only prohibiting donating money directly to a candidate) that corporations
were able to defeat the purpose of the law by supporting candidates in other
ways, Congress banned ―expenditures‖ as well as contributions.29 The
hallmark of an expenditure was that even though it was made for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, it was not paid to a candidate
(or her organization or party) but was supposedly made independently,
without the candidate‘s participation or even prior knowledge.30
As First Amendment speech law became more robust, the Supreme
Court also began to make clear that restrictions on election speech had to
comply with First Amendment principles. Among other requirements, legislation restricting speech had to be ―narrowly tailored‖ to focus on the precise matter with which Congress was legitimately concerned, and it could
not be so vague as to leave uncertain the conduct that was proscribed.
Court decisions made it clear, for example, that the expenditure ban could
not preclude unions and corporations from communicating freely with their
members and stockholders.31
Congressional tinkering continued with the enactment in the early
1970s of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which provided some
public financing of presidential races, created a Federal Election Commission to oversee election regulation, and authorized corporations and unions
to set up electioneering organizations called Political Action Committees,
or PACs.32 Among other requirements, organizations like PACs had to be
funded with voluntary contributions that could not come from a corporation‘s or a union‘s treasury.33 In a 1972 opinion, the Court quoted approvingly a member of Congress who had said that the PAC-type arrangements
maintained ―the proper balance in regulating corporate and union political
activity required by sound policy and the Constitution.‖34

28

See Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 510 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
29
See War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68. The
temporary ban on expenditures was made permanent in the Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (1947), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. See Wis. Right To
Life, 551 U.S. at 511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976) (per curiam).
31
For a discussion of the cases establishing this limit on the ban, see Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. at
511–19 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (link).
32
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263;
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85–86, 109–10.
33
See id.
34
See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 431 (1972) (link). Judicial
interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act had earlier created the PAC arrangement. See id. at 402–31.
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Additional tinkering by the Supreme Court dealt with nonprofit corporations—not the business corporations that had been the focus of the Corrupt Practices Act. As this narrow tailoring finally emerged from several
cases, a nonprofit could engage in election speech if it was formed to promote political ideas (so its resources reflected political support rather than
commercial success), if it had no shareholders (so individuals who paid
money into it would not have their funds used to support candidates they
opposed), and if it was not established by, and did not accept contributions
from, a business corporation or union.35 (Citizens United was itself a nonprofit, albeit a wealthy one, but because it received a small amount of support from business corporations it was not entitled to this nonprofit
exemption.)
In 1976, the Court tinkered further in an important way. In Buckley v.
Valeo, while upholding the FECA‘s limitations on contributions, to avoid
running afoul of the First Amendment‘s proscription against vagueness, it
construed ―expenditures‖ to include only communications that expressly
advocated the election or defeat of identified candidates.36 Then, on First
Amendment grounds (restricting speech without sufficiently compelling
reasons) it overturned the expenditures ban, so construed, as to ―persons‖
(including individuals), although it did not address—and therefore left intact—the law‘s separate ban on expenditures by corporations and unions.37
The grandest tinkering of all came about in response to the foreseeable
consequence of the constrained meaning assigned to ―expenditures.‖ Just
as the narrow construction of contributions had earlier led to the loophole of
expenditures, so the narrow construction of expenditures led to the loophole
of ―issue ads.‖ Eschewing what came to be called ―magic words,‖ such as
―vote for‖ or ―vote against,‖ electioneering proceeded apace under the guise
of discussing issues, not candidates. Instead of urging viewers to ―vote
against Jane Doe,‖ an ad might condemn Jane Doe‘s record on a selected
issue and then encourage viewers to ―call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think.‖38
The result was that in 2002 Congress enacted a comprehensive new
regulatory scheme, sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold, called the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).39 To address
the ―issue ads‖ problem, the BCRA forbade corporations to engage in ―electioneering communications‖ for thirty days before a federal primary and for
35

See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986)

(link).
36

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1976) (per curiam).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010) (summarizing Buckley‘s holdings).
38
See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 126–27 (2003) (link).
39
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 201, 203, 116 Stat. 81, 88–
90, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i), 441b(b)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. iv).
37
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sixty days before a federal general election.40 (This was the provision that
immediately affected Citizens United, which wished to make its antiHillary movie available through video-on-demand technology within these
time periods.41) The BCRA defined ―electioneering communication‖ as
―any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication‖ within the pre-election
run-up periods that refers to a candidate and (except for presidential candidates) is geographically targeted.42
The BCRA‘s constitutionality was promptly challenged under the First
Amendment, but in 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the basic scheme in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.43 Citing a number of opinions
in which it had said that the importance of elections in a democratic society
justified imposing restrictions on the election speech of business corporations, the McConnell opinion emphasized preventing the appearance of corruption in the electoral process and avoiding erosion of citizen confidence
in government.44 The Court also said the BCRA was not unconstitutionally
overbroad because, among other reasons, corporations and unions could
―finance genuine issue ads during [the run-up] timeframes by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated [PAC] fund.‖45
In short, over the nearly one hundred years from 1907 to the enactment
of the BCRA, Congress exercised its constitutional power to regulate the
manner of conducting federal elections by crafting regulations that limited
the electoral role of corporations and, later, unions. In the process, it treated
corporations and unions very differently from human beings. Although
corporations, for better or worse, had managed to overcome their artificial
beginnings and acquire considerable First Amendment protection, the congressional interest in preventing corruption, or the appearance of it, from infecting elections had also permitted serious regulation of corporate election
speech. While insistent upon compliance with First Amendment requirements, the Supreme Court had not viewed that regulation as violating corporations‘ speech rights.

40

See BCRA § 201(a).
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
42
Id.
43
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (―In the main we uphold BCRA‘s two principal, complementary
features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications‖).
44
See id. at 203–07. The McConnell opinion said that the Court had ―repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at ‗the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public‘s support for
the corporation‘s political ideas.‘‖ Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 657–61 (describing cases justifying restrictions
on corporate election speech based on democratic principles) (link).
45
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206–07.
41
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II. THE APPLECART UPSET
Citizens United upset the applecart big time by ruling that, except for
direct contributions to candidates, corporate election speech could not be
restricted (and that the anti-Hillary Clinton movie could be shown) because
corporations had virtually the same election speech rights as human beings.46 Also upset (overruled) were two of the Court‘s earlier decisions that
had upheld restrictions on corporate election speech under the First
Amendment47
The reasoning was breathtakingly simple. It amounted to asserting that
the First Amendment did not permit regulation of speech based on the
―identity‖ of the speaker, meaning ―identity‖ as a corporation—not, say,
Texaco versus Shell, but being a corporation rather than a human being.48
Yet wasn‘t the speech of prisoners, soldiers, students, and government employees restricted precisely because of their ―identity‖ as prisoners, soldiers,
students, and government employees? These cases, however, are all ―inapposite,‖ says Citizens United. The explanation for that succinct dismissal is
set out in three short sentences, written by Justice Kennedy and agreed to
by the four other justices who made up the Citizens United 5-4 majority:


―[T]hese rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions. . . .‖49



―These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are
certain governmental functions that cannot operate without
some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.‖50



―The corporate [election speech] at issue in this case, however,
would not interfere with governmental functions . . . .‖51

Let‘s consider the first two of these sentences—the third we‘ll look at
later. (One of the dissenting justices, John Paul Stevens, wrote that the
―proposition‖ in the second sentence ―lies at the heart of this case.‖52) Is it
a governmental function to ―operate‖ federal elections, just as it is a governmental function to operate prisons, armies, schools, and post offices?
Not in the sense that prisons, armies, schools, and post offices are operated
46

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
Citizens United overruled Austin, 494 U.S. 652, and McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
48
See id. at 899.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 946 n.46.
47
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with paid government employees. But Congress does have the power to
pass laws about the way members of Congress are elected. The Constitution says that the ―[m]anner‖ of holding congressional elections within each
state shall be determined by the state legislature but then adds that Congress
may ―make or alter such Regulations.‖53 In other words, Congress may
―make‖ regulations—that is, pass laws—to govern the manner in which
elections for members of Congress are held. The Supreme Court has held
that this power extends to presidential elections as well: ―The power of
Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.‖54
On what basis, then, did Justice Kennedy and four other justices reach
their Citizens United conclusion? If it was constitutional to prevent prisoners from encouraging each other to form a prisoner‘s union because of the
needs of running a prison; if it was constitutional to prevent army officers
from encouraging soldiers to disobey orders because of the needs of running an army; if it was constitutional to prevent government employees
from taking part in political campaigns because of the need to avoid an appearance that ―political justice‖ might be dispensed; why wasn‘t it constitutional to prevent business corporations from swamping voters with
broadcast, cable, and satellite electioneering during the run-up to federal
elections because of the need to keep those elections free from an appearance of corruption?
Unhappily, intellectual irresponsibility appears to be the answer. One
way to demonstrate this is to consider how Justice Kennedy handles two
Supreme Court cases, decided in 1976 and 1978, to which he attributes the
―principle‖ that is the keystone of his Citizens United opinion—that the
First Amendment precludes government from restricting speech based on
―corporate identity.‖
In Buckley v. Valeo, numerous plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of each of five major features of the FECA: (1) public funding of presidential campaigns; (2) limitations on campaign contributions; (3)
limitations on independent expenditures; (4) disclosure requirements for
both contributions and expenditures; and (5) creation of a Federal Election
Commission to administer the Act.55 The case produced six different opinions that ranged from viewing most of the Act as constitutional to most of
it as unconstitutional. The Court‘s opinion was issued per curiam, meaning
―by the court,‖ without—as is the usual practice—identifying an individual
Justice responsible for authoring it.
What emerged from the per curiam Buckley opinion was that the Federal Election Commission and public financing measures of the FECA sur53
54
55

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (link).
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934) (link).
See 424 U.S. 1, 9 (1976).
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vived, with some modifications, as did disclosure requirements.56 Limitations on campaign contributions were also upheld because of the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of it.57
Limitations on independent expenditures, however, were ruled unconstitutional because, the per curiam opinion said, this governmental interest was
inadequate to justify the infringement on speech that resulted from barring
independent expenditures.58
Buckley‘s reasons for distinguishing between contributions and independent expenditures will be discussed in connection with Justice Kennedy‘s third sentence. Of present interest is Justice Kennedy‘s use of Buckley
respecting corporations as ―speakers.‖ As to this, his Citizens United opinion says that, ―the principle established in Buckley . . . [is] that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s
corporate identity.‖59
This sentence is astonishing for three reasons. One is that Buckley contains no discussion of suppressing speech on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity. Both the contribution section of the law that was upheld
and the independent expenditures section that was not applied to all manner
of ―persons‖—human beings, groups, associations, corporations, and so
on.60 When Buckley‘s analysis led it to strike down limitations on independent expenditures, it was because of the restrictive effect those limitations
were perceived to have on the election speech of all those ―persons,‖ including human beings.61 Buckley‘s discussion of this restrictive effect did
not mention suppressing election speech ―on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity.‖62
The second reason for astonishment is that Buckley left untouched a
provision of the FECA—the then-current version of the Corrupt Practices
Act—that did suppress corporate election speech. This section of the Act,
separate from the one that applied to ―persons,‖ prohibited both contributions and independent expenditures by national banks, corporations and labor unions, thus singling out those entities for different treatment than
human beings.63
56

Id. at 143.
Id. at 25–29.
58
See id. at 39–45.
59
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
60
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17–23.
61
In a later opinion the Court said that ―. . . Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals . . . .‖ McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 122
(2003).
63
In fact, even as to human beings Buckley left the door ajar for future developments, saying that
independent expenditures did not ―presently appear‖ to pose an apparent corruption threat comparable to
the threat arising from direct contributions. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.
63
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. V 1976) (reflecting amendments through Jan. 1, 1975)).
57
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Moreover, not only was this separate section not declared unconstitutional by Buckley, it was not even attacked by the plaintiffs (who did attack
virtually everything else in the FECA).64 The failure of the Buckley plaintiffs to include the separate section among their targets could, of course, explain Buckley‘s silence about it—except that Buckley was not silent about
this different treatment of corporations and unions but actually referred to it
approvingly. Explaining that contribution limitations were being upheld in
part because they left persons free to engage in political expression in ways
other than through contributions to candidates, such as through ―political
funds‖ (essentially, PACs), the Buckley opinion said that a ―prime example‖
of such a fund was that the bank/corporation/union section ―permits corporations and labor unions to establish segregated funds to solicit voluntary
contributions to be utilized for political purposes.‖65
―It is implausible,‖ said Justice Stevens in his Citizens United dissent,
―that Buckley covertly invalidated FECA‘s separate corporate and union
campaign expenditure restriction even though that restriction had been on
the books for decades before Buckley and would remain on the books, undisturbed, for decades after.‖66 He might have added that it is also implausible that Buckley would have referred approvingly to a section of the law it
viewed as unconstitutional.
There is a third reason for astonishment at Justice Kennedy‘s statement
that Buckley established the principle that political speech may not be suppressed on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity: in the years following Buckley a number of Supreme Court opinions either said or strongly
implied that the government might do just that, or said that the question of
whether it could was open and undecided. Here are some examples:
1978—―Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a
danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.‖67
1981—―[D]iffering restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these
entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they
therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to
protect the integrity of the electoral process.‖68

64

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 954 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n.31.
66
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 958 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
67
First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (link).
68
Cal. Med. Ass‘n v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) (link).
65

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/4/

213

105: 203 (2010)

Observations on Citizens United

1982—―The governmental interest in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected representatives has long been recognized, and there is no reason why it
may not in this case be accomplished by treating unions, corporations, and similar organizations differently from individuals.‖69
1986—―The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are
not an indication of popular support for the corporation‘s political ideas. . . . By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be financed through a political committee expressly
established to engage in campaign spending, [the law] seeks to
prevent this threat to the political marketplace.‖70
1990—―[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures.
Corporate wealth can unfairly
influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise
of political contributions.‖71
2003—―Today, as in 1907, the law focuses on the ‗special characteristics of the corporate structure‘ that threaten the integrity of the
political process. . . . ‗Substantial aggregations of wealth
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political
―war chests‖ which could be used to incur political debts from
legislators.‘‖72
2003—―[O]ur prior decisions regarding campaign finance regulation . . . ‗represent respect for the ―legislative judgment that
the special characteristics of the corporate structure require
particularly careful regulation.‖‘ We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at ‗the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public‘s support for the corporation‘s political
ideas.‘‖73
69

Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Nat‘l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1982) (citing Cal.
Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 201) (internal citation omitted) (link).
70
Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986).
71
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
72
Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (link).
73
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
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Each of these statements commanded at least a majority of the thenJustices; the 1982 opinion was unanimous.74 It is plain, therefore, that not
only was the ―principle‖ Justice Kennedy says Buckley established unmentioned in the Buckley opinion, but also that it was not thereafter viewed by
the Court as having been established.
Justice Kennedy continues to astonish with his handling of another Supreme Court opinion, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,75 to which
he also attributes the ―principle‖ that the First Amendment precludes government from restricting speech based on ―corporate identity.‖76 For some
time the Massachusetts state government had been attempting to persuade
voters to approve a referendum establishing a graduated personal income
tax.77 Business corporations, particularly banks, had been effective opponents in previous failed referendum votes.78 Finally, the Massachusetts legislature came up with the stratagem of eliminating banks and their allies
from the referendum ―game‖ by forbidding them from making contributions
or expenditures to influence referendum votes.79 The law contained an exception for referendum issues that ―materially affected‖ the businesses of
banks or business corporations, but by definition income tax referenda were
not in that category.80 In 1978, Bellotti ruled that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment.81
Justice Kennedy‘s handling of Bellotti is irresponsible in at least two
ways. The first is the failure to discuss the significance of the fact that Bellotti is about a referendum, not a candidate election. This is important because, as first year law students are taught, general statements in judicial
opinions are to be interpreted in light of, and generally confined in their application to, the situation to which they are addressed. That Bellotti was
about a referendum, not a candidate election, is a critical fact because a referendum—unlike a candidate—cannot be politically beholden to supporters. The Bellotti opinion itself explicitly noted the distinction: ―Referenda
are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption
perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . . simply is not present in
a popular vote on a public issue.‖82
As a first year law student would quickly have understood, statements
in the Bellotti opinion that Justice Kennedy found useful for his Citizens
United discussion should responsibly have been confined to referenda and
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 197.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010).
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
Id. at 775.
See id. at 767–68.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 790 (internal citations omitted).
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not applied to candidate elections. Indeed, the Bellotti opinion went out of
its way to make it clear that it wanted its statements to be confined in just
this way:
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes
such as the [Corrupt Practices Act] was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of
political debts. The importance of the government interest
in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted. The
case before us presents no comparable problem, and our
consideration of a corporation‘s right to speak on issues of
general public interest [i.e., referenda] implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a
political campaign for election to public office. Congress
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger
of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures
by corporations to influence candidate elections.83
In the face of these explicit Bellotti statements, emphasizing the importance of the distinction between the risk of corruption in referenda and candidate elections, a reader is incredulous to find that Justice Kennedy
repeatedly cites, quotes, and paraphrases the Bellotti opinion without referring to that distinction.
Justice Kennedy also abuses the Bellotti opinion by attributing to it (as
he did earlier to Buckley) the ―principle‖ that speech cannot be restricted
because of corporate ―identity‖: ―Bellotti . . . reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based on
the speaker‘s corporate identity.‖84 ―Bellotti‘s central principle [was] that
the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker‘s corporate identity.‖85
The trouble is that Bellotti neither ―reaffirmed‖ nor articulated any
such principle. What it did was strike down a law that distinguished one
kind of corporation from another—one whose business was materially affected by a referendum from one whose business was not. In fact, so carried away was Justice Kennedy by his ―principle‖ that one of his quotations
failed to indicate that it truncated Bellotti‘s language. Justice Kennedy
quoted this from Bellotti: ―[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment
protection ‗simply because its source is a corporation.‘‖86 Had the omitted
language been included, Justice Kennedy‘s quote would have read,
―[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‗simply be83
84
85
86

Id. at 788 n.26 (internal citations omitted).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 900 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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cause its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a
court, a material effect on its business or property.‘‖87
Bellotti does say that the ―inherent worth‖ of speech—its capacity for
informing the public—does not depend on whether the source is a corporation or an individual.88 But this is promptly followed by two disclaimers—
that the Court is neither addressing ―the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First
Amendment,‖ nor considering ―whether, under different circumstances, a
justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied
to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations . . . .‖89
In two respects, therefore, Justice Kennedy mangles Bellotti. First,
Bellotti decided nothing—was indeed at pains to decide nothing—about
corporate expenditures in candidate elections. Second, the opinion did not
say or decide that corporations could never be distinguished from human
beings under the First Amendment. Had Justice Kennedy written his discussion of Bellotti in a law school examination, he would have flunked.
There is one additional observation to be made about Justice Kennedy‘s treatment of Buckley and Bellotti. Justice Kennedy wrote that had the
FECA‘s prohibition of direct expenditures by banks, corporations, and unions been challenged in the wake of Buckley, the prohibition ―could not
have been squared with the reasoning and analysis of [Buckley].‖90 Presumably, this means that the FECA‘s prohibition of independent expenditures
by banks, corporations, and unions would also have been declared unconstitutional had that issue been submitted to the Buckley Court.
Yet the Justices who approved Bellotti‘s language were, for the most
part, the same Justices who had approved Buckley‘s language two years earlier.91 In Bellotti, these Justices wrote that, ―Congress might well be able to
demonstrate . . . a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.‖92 This provides an obvious way to ―square‖ the reasoning and analysis of Buckley—
which addressed ―issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals‖93—with the FECA‘s prohibition limited to banks, cor-

87

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. This is not an inconsequential deletion of a few words, for in following
sentences the Bellotti opinion makes clear its view that the ―materially affecting‖ phrase amounts to a
requirement ―that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.‖
Id.
88
See id. at 777.
89
See id. at 777 & n.13.
90
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
91
The composition of the Court was, in fact, unchanged, but Justice Stevens did not participate in
Buckley. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 5 (1976) (per curiam).
92
435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
93
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (describing the Buckley opinion).
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porations, and unions. As a matter of the plain meaning of language,94 it is
impossible to imagine that the Justices who subscribed to Bellotti‘s statements (for example, that Congress might be able to demonstrate a corruption danger in corporate independent expenditures in candidate elections)
could have meant what Justice Kennedy understands them to have meant in
Buckley just two years earlier—that political speech could never be suppressed based on the corporate identity of the speaker.95
We come, finally, to Justice Kennedy‘s third sentence: ―The corporate
independent expenditures at issue in this case [paying for the anti-Hillary
movie and for making it available through video-on-demand technology in
the final weeks before a federal election] . . . would not interfere with governmental functions . . . .‖ The sentence is crucial because if it is concluded that no governmental function is being interfered with—in this case
that corporate electioneering communications do not give rise to an appearance of corruption that interferes with the governmental function of regulating elections—there is nothing to offset the First Amendment‘s command.
What exactly is Justice Kennedy‘s basis, then, for this crucial third sentence?
At the outset we should put aside Justice Kennedy‘s several paeans to
the value of corporate speech and the harm that may flow from suppressing
it. Had soldiers been free to speak against our Vietnam misadventure the
country might have been spared a great tragedy. Millions of government
employees may have particularly useful things to say about what goes on
inside government agencies. The issue is not the value of speech; that is
acknowledged by all. The issue is whether independent expenditures by
corporations give rise to an appearance of corruption, for avoiding that appearance is acknowledged to be a governmental interest compelling enough
to justify restricting the speech that causes the appearance.
94

See supra text accompanying notes 86–87.
Four years before Buckley was decided, Justice Powell, who joined in the Buckley opinion and
authored Bellotti, dissented from a decision holding that unions might lawfully make political contributions and expenditures, notwithstanding the FECA‘s bank/corporation/union prohibition, so long as the
contributions and expenditures came from funds voluntarily given to the union for such purpose. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v United States, 407 U.S. 385, 444–46 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Contending that the prohibition on banks‘, corporations‘, and unions‘ contributions and expenditures
should be accepted as written, Justice Powell said: ―[O]pening of the door to extensive corporate and
union influence on the elective and legislative processes must be viewed with genuine concern. This
seems to me to be a regressive step as contrasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in
recent years designed to assure that elections are indeed free and representative.‖ Id. at 450.
It demands considerable mental agility to imagine that between arguing in 1972 that it was ―regressive‖ to open the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the elective and legislative
processes, by not upholding the prohibition of FECA as written, see Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 450, and in
1978 that ―Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections,‖ see Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 788 n.26, Justice Powell had concluded in Buckley that a ban on corporate expenditures was facially unconstitutional.
95
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Evidence that corporate independent expenditures give rise to an appearance of corruption is extensive. The formal record begins in the 1940s
when, because corporations and unions had become adept at circumventing
the contributions ban that dated back to 1907, Congress outlawed independent expenditures.96
By the time Congress enacted the BCRA over fifty years later,97 substantial information on corporate independent expenditures had been accumulated. In McConnell, the case that ruled that much of the BCRA was
constitutional, one of the trial judges had summarized the following from a
trial record that ran over 100,000 pages:


Corporations and labor unions routinely notify Members of
Congress as soon as they air electioneering communications.



Members of Congress express appreciation for those communications.



Campaign organizations are aware of who runs advertisements
on the candidate‘s behalf, and when and where they are run.



Members of Congress seek to have corporations and unions
run such advertisements.



After elections are over, corporations and unions often seek
―credit‖ for their support.98

On the basis of this and much other testimony, the judge concluded,
―The record powerfully demonstrates that electioneering communications
paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations
endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived
by the public as corrupting.‖99
None of this is surprising. Nor did it seem so to the American public.
The McConnell record included a poll in which some 80% of respondents
said they believed that those who engaged in electioneering communications received special consideration from the elected officials they had supported.100
Against this background, then, what is the factual basis for Justice
Kennedy‘s contrary conclusion that ―[for] the reasons explained
96

See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (1947).
See supra note 39.
98
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 623–24 (D.D.C. 2003) (link).
99
Id. at 622–23.
100
See id. at 623.
97
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above, . . . independent expenditures, including those made by corporations,
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption‖?101 Astonishingly, there isn‘t any. The reasons ―explained above‖ are these:

101
102
103
104
105
106



A reference to Buckley‘s conclusion that the government‘s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption was inadequate to justify banning independent expenditures. Buckley‘s
conclusion, however, was about a ban that included humans;
Buckley expressed no conclusion about whether corporate independent expenditures, considered separately from humans‘
independent expenditures, could lead to an appearance of corruption.102



An assertion that absence of coordination with the candidate
―alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate . . .‖103
addresses actual corruption, not the appearance of it. (And ―alleviates‖ is not synonymous with ―eliminates.‖)



An assertion that ―[t]he fact that speakers may have influence
over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt‖104 likewise deals with actual corruption, not
its appearance.



A reference to the government‘s failure to assert that political
processes had been corrupted in the twenty-six states that do
not restrict independent expenditures105 similarly refers to actual corruption, not the appearance of it.



An unsupported assertion that ―the appearance of influence or
access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy‖ is followed by two sentences to the effect that
spending money to persuade voters presupposes that the voters
have ultimate influence over elected officials, a presupposition
said to be inconsistent with any suggestion that corporate independent expenditures may cause the feared loss of faith.106

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam)).
Id. at 910.
Id. at 908–09.
See id. at 910.
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After pointing out that the McConnell record contains no direct examples of votes being exchanged for expenditures107—it would have been
―quite remarkable,‖ observes Justice Stevens‘ dissent, if Congress had
created a record detailing such behavior by its own members108—Justice
Kennedy concludes as follows:
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then
surely there is cause for concern. We must give weight to
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies
enacted by law, however, must comply with the First
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the governing rule.109
What emerges from this review of Justice Kennedy‘s ―reasons explained above‖ is that over six decades of congressional regulation of corporate independent expenditures are swept away by fiat. There is no—
literally no—factual support for Justice Kennedy‘s crucial third sentence.
Three further observations may be made about that sentence. The first
is to note the irony that Justice Kennedy complains of the government‘s
failure to offer evidence that corporate independent expenditures may lead
to an appearance of corruption, while offering up his own contrary conclusion without any evidence at all.110
The second observation relates to a 2009 case involving a West Virginia judicial election in which Justice Kennedy wrote the Court‘s opinion. In
107

Id. (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C. 2003)).
Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109
Id. at 911 (majority opinion).
110
Moreover, there is at least one reason for the government‘s failure in which Justice Kennedy is
complicit: supplying such evidence became unnecessary when Citizens United withdrew its claim that
the BCRA section it challenged was unconstitutional on its face. When that claim was, in effect, reinstated by Justice Kennedy‘s opinion, Justice Kennedy did not offer the government a renewed opportunity to supply evidence in the now changed circumstances. As the dissenting opinion put it, ―five Justices
. . . changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law,‖ id. at 932 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but they did not give the government an evidentiary opportunity to address the changed case.
The dissent added, ―By reinstating a claim that Citizens United abandoned, the Court gives it a perverse
litigating advantage over its adversary, which was deprived of the opportunity to gather and present information necessary to its rebuttal.‖ Id. at 933 n.4.
Having changed the case, Justice Kennedy could still have decided Citizens United on any number
of narrow grounds and not made the proscription of electioneering communications invalid under any
and all circumstances and as applied to any type and size of corporation. Citizens United is, after all, not
General Motors. During oral argument, as Justice Stevens points out, Citizens United‘s own lawyer
conceded that its argument ―definitely would not be the same‖ if the Hillary movie were to be distributed by General Motors. Id. at 936 (quoting the transcript from oral argument).
108
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Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a West Virginia judge had been elected
with the aid of enormous independent expenditures by Massey‘s principal
officer.111 The newly elected judge then cast the deciding vote in a case of
great significance to Massey Coal.112 Justice Kennedy wrote that the risk of
bias arising from these facts meant that the judge should have not have
voted in the case.113
In his Citizens United opinion Justice Kennedy concluded, correctly,
that Caperton was distinguishable from Citizens United in a number of
ways. For example, it involved a judge and the issue of fair trial, not members of Congress and the First Amendment. Nonetheless, Caperton acknowledges that independent expenditures in candidate elections can lead to
an appearance of bias. This makes it all the more surprising that in Citizens
United Justice Kennedy in effect reaches the contrary conclusion.114
The third observation is that in deciding that the needs of running prisons, armies, schools, and federal elections justified restrictions on speech,
the Court had consistently said that it should pay great deference to the
judgment of those in charge. In a prisoner case, for example, these matters
were said to be peculiarly within the province and professional experience
of corrections officials.115 In Citizens United, deference to the judgment of
those charged by the Constitution with regulating federal elections is conspicuous by its absence.
III. IN DEFENSE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY?
Justice Kennedy is an accomplished jurist, and a number of arguments
may be advanced in an effort to understand how he could have written as he
did in Citizens United. Buckley did, after all, rule unconstitutional a section
of the FECA that banned independent expenditures by corporations (who
were included in the definition of ―persons‖).116 Post-Buckley Supreme
Court opinions that leave open the question of whether corporate independent expenditures can be treated differently than individual expenditures
address issues that are technically distinguishable from the issue posed by
Citizens United and are therefore not binding precedents.

111

See 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (link).
See id. at 2257–58.
113
See id. at 2266.
114
It is also noteworthy that, while distinguishing Caperton because of its different context, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910, Justice Kennedy did not similarly distinguish Bellotti because it addressed referenda rather than candidate elections.
115
See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners‘ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977) (link).
116
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam). Buckley‘s reasons for setting aside
limitations on expenditures while upholding those on contributions, see id. at 14–23, 44–51, are complicated and ultimately unpersuasive. In practice, they led to a distinction between issue ads and electioneering which both ―sides‖ in the campaign finance debate agreed was useless. See David B. Magleby,
The Importance of the Record in McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L. J. 285, 287–88 (2004).
112
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In addition, as Harry Kalven observed long ago, the Supreme Court‘s
First Amendment opinions do not flow ineluctably out of a comprehensive
theory; neither are they all models of clarity. A court could scissor snippets
from them to fashion almost any desired word picture. It is not surprising,
then, that in election speech cases the Court has typically been divided, and
that in some of them Justice Kennedy wrote dissenting opinions arguing
much as he later did in Citizens United.117
Moreover, in the real world of politics, it is difficult to draw a clear
line between discussing issues and electioneering, yet that must be done if
corporations are to remain free to speak about issues that arise in candidate
elections. And even if that line is drawn with reasonable clarity, we face
the challenge of juxtaposing the speech and press clauses of the First
Amendment, because no one suggests that the ―press‖—newspapers and
other media organizations—should be precluded from either candidate or
issue advocacy even though they are organized in corporate form.
There is also something to be said in defense of Justice Kennedy‘s refusal to give more weight to the prisoner, soldier, student, and government
employee precedents. Elections and election speech lie at the core of our
democratic system and at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech about
election issues and candidates is our central political forum—our national
town hall meeting, so to speak—where we make fundamental decisions
about the conduct of our collective lives as citizens. Here, above all, the
First Amendment should hold sway. The same cannot be said about those
precedents.
Underlying these and other difficult issues is America‘s strong First
Amendment tradition that the cure for unpopular or harmful speech is not
suppression, but more speech (leading the ACLU, for example, to support
the Citizens United result).118 In the concluding justification for his third
sentence, Justice Kennedy references ―our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the [First Amendment‘s] governing rule.‖119
Justice Kennedy‘s ultimate reliance on First Amendment law and tradition harkens back to Harry Kalven‘s comment on the challenges of theorizing about the First Amendment. As legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin
points out, some theorizing is nonetheless necessary. Otherwise the
Amendment‘s language would be a ―meaningless mantra to be incanted

117

In a separate opinion in a 2003 case, Justice Kennedy referred to several of his dissents in previous election speech cases, saying he could ―give no weight to those authorities.‖ Fed. Election
Comm‘n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163–64 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
118
See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Appellant on Supplemental Question, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205)
(link).
119
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
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whenever a judge wants for any reason to protect some form of communication.‖120
So what is Justice Kennedy‘s theory in Citizens United? The most
prominent is the ―informed electorate‖ theory: ―Freedom of political speech
is,‖ as Dworkin phrases the theory, ―an essential condition of an effective
democracy because it ensures that voters have access to as wide and diverse
a range of information and political opinion as possible.‖121
Does the ―informed electorate‖ theory provide a solid philosophical
base for Justice Kennedy‘s opinion? Hardly. Justice Kennedy‘s Citizens
United opinion offers no reason for supposing (to quote Dworkin again)
―that allowing rich corporations to swamp elections with money will in fact
produce a better-informed public.‖122 In fact, Dworkin argues, there are reasons for believing that a worse-informed electorate will be the consequence.
One reason is that the ―volume‖ of corporate electioneering ―will suggest more public support than there actually is.‖123 (The resources in a business corporation‘s treasury are obviously not an indication of popular
support for the corporation‘s political ideas.) Another reason is that, although corporate electioneering purports to address the public interest, corporate managers ―are legally required to spend corporate funds only to
promote their corporation‘s own financial interest.‖124 Dworkin offers this
illustration of these ―worse-informed‖ consequences:
A public debate about climate change, for instance, would
not do much to improve the understanding of its audience if
speaking time were auctioned so that energy companies
were able to buy vastly more time than academic scientists.125
Indeed, precisely because elections lie at the core of our democratic
system, Congress‘ desire to protect the integrity of the electoral process
against the appearance of corruption and the erosion of confidence in this
core feature of our governance system should be given great weight as one
of the most compelling of governmental interests. Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of Justice Kennedy‘s Citizens United opinion is its failure
even to discuss in any meaningful way the tension between a core First
Amendment value and a most compelling governmental interest. One
searches Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in vain for any serious discussion of
120

Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 13, 2010),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy (link).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
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why swamping the electorate with corporate-funded broadcast, cable, and
satellite electioneering communications in the final weeks before federal
elections will lead to a better-informed electorate. Instead we are given a
First Amendment mantra and an airy assertion that corporate electioneering
will not give rise to an appearance of corruption or cause the electorate to
lose faith in democracy.
CONCLUSION
―Intellectually irresponsible,‖ then, remains a fair characterization of
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion. The mishandling of Buckley and Bellotti is
egregious, the assertion that they compel Citizens United is indefensible.
The complaint about the absence of factual support, with none supplied for
his crucial third sentence, is disingenuous. The corporate ―identity‖ mantra
ignores the reality that although the capacity of speech to inform the electorate may not depend on whether the speech comes from a corporation or a
human being, the capacity of speech to give rise to an appearance of corruption assuredly may.
Most breathtaking of all is the way in which Justice Kennedy‘s third
sentence takes leave of common sense. Recall all those profits of just the
top 100 of the Fortune 500 companies, and the ratio of more than six lobbyists for every member of Congress on health care alone. Without a
smidgeon of supporting evidence, Justice Kennedy‘s third sentence, in effect, asserts that members of Congress will be unaffected by now-credible
threats from those and other lobbyists to spend unlimited sums advertising
against their reelection. That the expenditure of such overwhelming sums
on electioneering will not create precisely the ―political debts‖ that Bellotti
termed the overriding concerns of the Corrupt Practices Act. And that the
making of such credible threats will not create an appearance that justifies
congressional restrictions on how those billions of corporate dollars can be
deployed in candidate elections.
―Political debts‖ may, however, be too tame a description of a harsh
reality. As law professor Jamie Raskin puts it, although their outsized coffers would easily enable the Fortune 500 companies to ―participate in every
single federal and state race in the nation,‖ that will not be necessary.126 If
the Citizens United opinion has not already made the new reality clear,
companies spending whatever it takes to defeat a small number of ―target‖
candidates will quickly succeed in ―destroy[ing] any future political opposition in Congress or the states to corporate positions.‖127
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Polls indicate that the American people have not similarly taken leave
of common sense.128 What they will or can now do remains to be seen; numerous proposals for a constitutional amendment and for partial legislative
fixes (such as requiring corporate CEOs to take on-camera responsibility
for their ads and strengthening disclosure requirements) have surfaced.129
What is plain, however, is that, while being handed a new paradigm of ―activist‖ judging, the American people have been confronted with a fearsome
problem that cuts to the very core of their governance system. In a functioning democracy, said Justice Stevens, ―the public must have faith that its
representatives owe their positions to the people, not to the corporations
with the deepest pockets.‖130
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